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LECTURE IN HUMAN RIGHTS: TAX, POLICY, GLOBAL 
ECONOMICS, LABOR, AND JUSTICE IN LIGHT OF COVID-19 
 
 






International Tax Law has extensive ramifications on the wealth gap between 
wealthy developed nations and poor developing nations. This divide in prosperity 
has been made clear again in the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Developing nations are currently ill-equipped to adapt to, and regulate, an 
equitable system of taxation on a domestic level. A further challenge is the difficulty 
of ensuring that foreign investors, especially multinational corporations, are able 
to comply with tax regulations. Developed nations such as the United States and 
members of the European Union must continue to work with developing nations to 
reduce tax evasion and increase revenues in a manner that is equitable for 
developing nations. The recent enactments of the Global Intangible Low-Tax 
Income (“GILTI”) and the Base Erosion Anti-Abuse Tax (“BEAT”) aim to ensure 
that multinational corporations comply with U.S. tax rates. GILTI and BEAT 
provide developing countries a framework for raising tax revenues from 
multinational companies. These tax innovations may help developing nations raise 
tax revenues, but they also restrict the ability of these nations to create their own 
tax schemes. If developing nations can coordinate a tax scheme that allows them to 
raise revenue from multinational corporations, they will ensure a more equitable 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The ongoing coronavirus pandemic has highlighted one of the most significant 
global problems of our time: the wealth-gap between the wealthy developed 
countries in the Global North and the poor developing countries in the Global 
South.1 The lack of resources in the poor nations has led to a disparity in living 
conditions compared to citizens of wealthier countries. The citizens in poor 
Southern nations have lower literacy rates, higher mortality rates, and lower wages, 
among other critical resource gaps. The global COVID-19 pandemic has 
exacerbated these problems and has placed more burdens on poor nations and their 
citizens. To adequately address these issues, wealthy countries must work with poor 
countries to develop a system of equitable wealth distribution and elevate the 
standard of living for all citizens. 
Part I of this article provides background information on systems of taxation in 
an international human rights context. It explores the challenges poor nations face 
in levying taxes, especially on multinational corporations and the wealthy. Part II 
details the manner in which international tax competition has steadily led to a 
decline in resources for poor countries while the race to the bottom has benefited 
the wealthy nations due to investors escaping tax regimes overseas. Lastly, Part III 
looks at some of the recent developments, specifically in U.S. tax law via the 2017 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act which may provide possible solutions to the global wealth 
gap by closing international tax loopholes through the enactments of the Global 
Intangible Low-Tax Income (GILTI) and the Base Erosion Anti-Abuse Tax 
(BEAT).  
 
I. INTERNATIONAL TAX LANDSCAPE IN THE CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
For many years, tax law has played a central role in basic human rights issues 
in the modern world. Due to recent increases in the large gap between the relatively 
wealthy global North and the relatively poor global South, tax law is more 
important than ever. In response to this gap, the United Nations set sustainable 
development goals to address issues of poverty 2  in the developing world. The 
sustainable development goals center around aspects of poverty such as: literacy3, 
 
1 Jean-Philippe Therein, Beyond the North-South Divide: The Two Tales of World Poverty, 20 Third 
World Quarterly 4, 723 (1999). 
2  U.N. Dep’t of Int’l Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc A/Res/70/1 (September 27, 2015). 
3 Id. at 17. 
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hunger4, access to basic resources needed to live a decent life5, the ability to vote, 
education6, and gender equality.7 There is a clear consensus that significant change 
must take place to realize each of these rights for individuals across the globe.  
Within the context of the current global pandemic and the potential of a global 
recession, the inequities of human rights are becoming worse. Global issues such 
as climate change and widespread migration pressures intersect with, and 
exacerbate, these problems.8 All of these issues, however, are in the background. 
For decades, the most fundamental problem has been that wealthy countries are not 
financially or politically willing to share resources with poor countries at the 
volume required to address substantial resource gaps as sharing resources would 
involve impossible rates of taxation.9 Most official government aid is miniscule in 
countries that are most in need of substantial aid. The general public of the United 
States perceives the amount of foreign aid to be much greater than it actually is.10 
Although foreign aid is a very small percentage of the United States federal 
government’s budget, it is under tremendous scrutiny. Wealthy nations need to 
share resources more equitably with poorer nations for these poorer nations to 
thrive.11 
Some economists believe the United States government needs to address the 
country’s internal wealth inequality before it can work towards global change. Even 
considering the inequality gap in the United States, to achieve global equality, 
economists have calculated that the degree of sharing needed would involve 
impossible rates of taxation that no wealthy country’s government would ever be 
willing to bear to distribute to the poorer countries.12   
 
 
4 Id. at 15. 
5 Id.  
6 Id. at 17. 
7 Id. at 18. 
8 Int’l Org. for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, IOM Research Series No. 31 (Nov. 2008). 
9  Wojciech Kopczuk, et al, The Limitations of Decentralized World Redistribution: An Optimal 
Taxation Approach, 49 EUR.  ECON. REV. 4, 1051 (2005).  
10 Hak-Seon Lee, Inequality and U.S. Public Opinion on Foreign Aid, 182 WORLD AFFAIRS 273 
(2019).  
11 As the Jewish source explains, “the poor of your city [must] come first.” Deuteronomy 15:11; 
Ferid Belhaj, Why Wealthy Countries Must Step Up Their Contribution to Fight Global Poverty, 
(Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2019/12/05/why-wealthy-countries-
must-step-up-their-contribution-to-fight-global-poverty (last visited Feb. 18, 2021). 
12 Slemrod, Joel B. and Kopczuk, Wojciech and Yitzhaki, Shlomo, Why World Redistribution Fails 
(Sept. 2002). NBER Working Paper No. w9186, Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=330325. 
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A.  Issues Stemming from Concentration of Wealth in Rich Nations 
 
The fundamental problem of global wealth inequality suggests that a more 
effective way of approaching the issue of unequal wealth concentration in rich 
nations is to try to help developing countries help themselves. That raises the 
taxation question of, how do developing countries raise revenue? In the United 
States, some of the main sources of revenue for the federal government in the last 
century have been the individual income tax and the corporate income tax. 13 
However, other wealthy countries generally rely more heavily on consumption 
taxes.14 None of these revenue sources work perfectly outside of wealthy countries, 
especially not in developing countries.  
Despite their downsides, consumption taxes are generally the biggest source of 
formal revenue for developing countries, even though a large part of their 
economies are informal. The informal sector is economic activity that is not 
reported to the state, and that is not regulated or protected by the State. Because this 
informal part of the economy is outside the formal system, it has been difficult to 
raise significant revenues from consumption taxes. 15  To aid this issue the 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) 16  has promoted the Value Added Tax 
(“VAT”) as an efficient source of revenues in many developing countries. For many 
years, the IMF has pressured developing countries to adopt this most popular and 
widespread consumption tax.17 Nevertheless, many poor countries have instead 
 
13 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Historical Tables: Receipts by Source 
1934-2025; see also Tax Policy Center, What are the sources of revenue for the Federal 
Government?, https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-sources-revenue-federal-
government (last visited Feb. 19, 2021) (In 2019 individual income tax amounted to 50% if federal 
U.S. revenue and the corporate tax 7%). 
14  Consumption taxes like the U.S. state sales tax or the value added tax are imposed on 
consumption, not income. The value added tax (VAT) is the biggest revenue raiser in most countries 
of the world. See Avi-Yonah, The Inexorable Rise of the VAT: Is the U.S. Next?, 150 TAX NOTES 
127 (Jan. 4, 2016). 
15 IMF, Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy, Report of the IMF Staff to the Executive Board 
(Jan. 22, 2019). 
16 The International Monetary Fund is an international financial organization composed of 190 
countries. The IMF states that the organization’s purpose is “to ensure the stability of the 
international monetary system—the system of exchange rates and international payments that 
enables countries (and their citizens) to transact with each other.” IMF, About the IMF, 
https://www.imf.org/en/About#:~:text=The%20International%20Monetary%20Fund%20(IMF,red
uce%20poverty%20around%20the%20world (last visited Feb. 15, 2021). 
17 See Nuria Molina and Javier Pereira, Critical Conditions: The IMF Maintains its Grip on Low-
Income Countries, Eur. Network on Debt and Dev. (Eurodad), Apr. 2008, at 4 (criticizing the IMF’s 
imposition of privatization and liberalization conditions on poor nations in exchange for resources). 
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imposed an import VAT, rather than consumption taxes, because they can control 
the imports of goods and therefore control more internal revenue.18 However, data 
shows these countries are also having a hard time collecting significant resources 
from VAT taxes.19  
Other taxation methods, such as personal income taxes, also have many 
problems. First, developing nations do not have enough resources to properly 
collect personal income tax.20 Unless an individual is employed by a large formal 
employer, which is part of the formal economy and the income tax is withheld from 
their wages, a collection problem will emerge. The lack of resources for developing 
nations is especially problematic when it comes to taxing the elite because some 
hide their money overseas. Even though hiding money overseas is illegal in almost 
every country in the world, it still happens frequently. Previously, these developing 
countries did not tax account holders on foreign source income but realized that this 
became an invitation for the wealthy to hide their money overseas and evade tax 
payments.21 
Finally, the most promising source of revenue for developing nations is the 
corporate tax.  Typically, in more developed nations, the corporate tax rate is less 
than 10% of total revenues, whereas the individual income tax rate amounts to over 
30% along with the VAT adding another 30%. 22  In developing countries, the 
average corporate tax rate used to be 25% of revenues but that has come under 
 
18 Eric Toder, Jim Nunns, and Joseph Rosenberg, Implications of Different Bases for a VAT, TAX 




19 Lilianne Ploumen, Why developing countries need to toughen up on taxes, THE GUARDIAN, (Jul. 
7, 2015, 4:47 AM) https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jul/07/why-
developing-countries-need-to-toughen-up-taxes-sdgs (last visited Feb. 20, 2021) (“Developing 
countries need support to broaden their tax base and build tax collection capacity. Two years ago, 
the Netherlands started giving technical assistance to developing countries, and we now plan to 
double our current contribution. Today, we are active in 10 countries and we are starting an initiative 
to generate extra resources for building tax collection capacity.”), See Kaisa Alavuotunk et al., The 
Effects of the Value-Added Tax on Revenue and Inequality, J. OF DEV. STUD., 490, 504 (2019) (study 
indicating that “VAT adoption has not led to increased government revenues”). 
20 Eric M. Zolt and Bird, Richard Miller, Redistribution Via Taxation: The Limited Role of the 
Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, UCLA L. REV., Vol. 52, 2005, UCLA School of 
Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 05-22, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=804704. 
21 Id.  
22 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Historical Tables: Receipts by Source 
1934-2025. 
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pressure within the last few decades. The main problem is not illegal tax evasion, 
but rather legal tax avoidance. Since the 1980s, the pressures of globalization have 
led to intense tax competition among developing countries to attract investment by 
multinationals. 23  Most portfolio investors focus on risk and do not invest in 
developing countries. However, there are other investors, namely multinationals, 
that invest in these countries anyway, via direct investment.  
To attract multinational corporations to their borders, developing countries have 
tended to offer various tax breaks. 24  The process begins with a multinational 
investor compiling a list of developing countries that they are interested in, and then 
investors narrow down these countries using non-tax considerations such as 
geographical location, political stability, education and infrastructure.25 Once the 
list has been narrowed, the multinational investor will systematically pitch an 
investment opportunity to different developing countries in exchange for 
significant tax breaks.26 Many developing countries agree to the presented terms, 
because they know that the investor will continue to move down the list, to other 
countries, if they do not accept. Additionally, developing nations agree to these 
large tax breaks because of the benefits the multinational corporations bring, such 
as job growth and boosts to the economy. 
One example of this process is from the 1990s involving Intel, the large 
American multinational corporation. Intel went to Israel and told the government 
they were willing to invest there but that they had an alternative option to invest in 
Ireland.27 Intel essentially wanted to know what Israel would offer them and choose 
the better option for themselves. In the end, Intel received the entire Israeli 
 
23 Charles Oman, Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Competition among 
Governments to Attract FDI, DEV. OF CENTRE OF THE ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. 
(2000), www.oecd.org/mena/competitiveness/35275189.pdf.  
24 Id. at 18 (“as the competition heats up, governments come under increasing pressure to engage in 
costly “bidding wars” that leads them continually to increase the level of public subsidies offered to 
investors — fiscal and financial “incentives” — until that level far surpasses any that could possibly 
be justifiable from society’s perspective”) 
25 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Hanging Together: A Multilateral Approach to Taxing Multinationals 
in Thomas Pogge and Krishen Mehta (eds.), Global Tax Fairness, 113 (2016); James R. Hines, Jr., 
& Eric M. Rice, Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business, Q. J. ECON. 109, 
149 (1994); Rosanne Altshuler and T. Scott Newlon, The Effects of U.S. Tax Policy on the Income 
Repatriation Patterns of U.S. Multinational Corporations, in Giovannini et al. (eds.), Studies in 
International Taxation (1993). 
26 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare 
State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1588, 1646 (2000). 
27 See Robert Lenzner, Investing, Not Giving, FORBES, Dec. 18, 1995, at 106. 
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Government development budget for that year, a billion dollars, which was used to 
build a factory. Intel later went back to Ireland, where they also received a tax break, 
in exchange for building a factory.28 The same has happened in Costa Rica, Brazil, 
Mexico and other developing nations. 29  This type of auction is typical and 
fundamentally means that because the corporate tax has come under significant 
pressure and reduction, there has been a significant reduction in revenues as well.  
 
B.  International Tax Regime: U.S. Follows Tax Residential System While 
Other Nations Utilize Different Methods 
 
Before getting to the heart of international tax system issues, it is important to 
explain the United States tax system and to provide context to the systems of other 
nations. Most countries in the world have an international tax regime, where the 
rules are different, but the concepts are similar to those of the United States’ system. 
The way many international tax systems are designed, are to first encompass the 
world of potential taxpayers and then to divide the taxpayers between residents and 
non-residents.30 From the United States perspective, any U.S. citizen is also a tax 
resident.31 However, not all countries follow the rule that tax residents must be 
present in the country to maintain residential status.32 
Each nation’s perspective on taxation of non-residents and residents differs. 
First, it is important to consider taxation of non-residents. For example, how does 
the United States tax non-residents either investing or conducting business in the 
United States? Generally, the United States’ system looks for another non-personal 
nexus because non-residents do not have a personal nexus (i.e., they are not 
residents or citizens) to the taxing jurisdiction.33 Although some non-U.S. source 
 
28  See Frankly Intel, IRISH TIMES (Jan. 31, 1997), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/frankly-
intel-1.27689 (noting Ireland’s low corporate tax rate as advantageous reason for Intel’s investment 
in Ireland); Shelley Emling, Ireland Works to Stay in the Outsourcing Game, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/05/your-money/ireland-works-to-stay-in-the-
outsourcing-game.html (noting Ireland’s reduction of their corporate tax rate from 16 percent to 
12.5 percent in 2003). 
29 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 26. 
30 It is important to note that the tax term ‘resident’ is not the same as the immigration court 
definition. 
31 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(30)(A). 
32 See Kyle Pomerleau, How Countries Define Their Income Tax Borders, TAX FOUND. (June 1, 
2015), https://taxfoundation.org/how-countries-define-their-income-tax-borders-0/.  
33 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al., U.S. International Taxation 31 (3d ed. 2011) ("The source 
rules are provisions of the Code (and tax treaties) that designate rules for assigning income to a 
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income is taxed in the United States when it is connected to a trade or business, the 
general idea is that the nexus must be found. Historically, there has also been 
conflict regarding whether corporations belong to the resident or nonresident 
category. Different countries use various control tests to determine this question. 
For example, within the United States, if the corporation was incorporated in the 
U.S., it is considered a tax resident. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, a 
corporation is a tax resident if it is managed and controlled from the U.K., and other 
former British colonies follow this approach, as do most E.U. member states.  
Further, there is a distinction between business income and non-business 
income. First, business income refers to the normal income tax scheme where net 
income is taxed annually. 34  Business income assessments examine business 
deductions as well as income. Once these two figures are netted, they can be applied 
to income tax at the normal rates.35 Second, non-business income oppositely refers 
to investment income that is not actively related to the conduct of business. 36 
Dividends, interest, royalties and capital gains are usually considered non-business 
income.  
An issue with non-business income in the United States is that it can encourage 
remote investors. A remote investor is a foreign taxpayer who has never been to the 
United States. In these situations, there can be no expectation that the remote 
investor will file tax returns because a net-based tax (allowing deductions) on 
foreign investors, which requires auditing those deductions, is very difficult to 
enforce. In addition, it is difficult to allow remote investors to claim deductions 
because there is no possibility of auditing them when tax returns are not filed.  
One way to overcome this taxation deficit is to impose taxation on a gross basis. 
This means no deductions will be allowed for incomes that are sourced in the U.S., 
but if the income falls within one of the types of taxable income, a 30% tax is 
imposed on a gross basis. This tax is collected by withholding. Then, treaties could 
apply to reduce the rate below 30%, sometimes to zero, for treaty country residents. 
Treaties could also apply to business income and limit the tax rate of the source 
country. For example, U.S. treaties typically reduce the withholding tax on U.S. 
 
particular jurisdiction."). 
34  Internal Revenue Serv., Topic No. 407 Business Income (last updated Mar. 5, 2021), 
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc407. 
35 Internal Revenue Serv., Topic No. 559 Net Investment Income Tax (last updated Mar. 12, 2021) 
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc559. 
36  Internal Revenue Serv., Topic No. 407 Business Income (last updated Mar. 5, 2021), 
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc407. 
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source dividends from 30% to 15% and U.S. source interest from 30% to 0%. 
Last, it is important to look at residents' taxation. On a worldwide basis, the 
United States has jurisdiction to tax residents on income regardless of the derived 
source.37 However, in 2017, the U.S. partially switched to an exemption system, 
under which dividends from foreign subsidiaries are exempt from U.S. tax.38 This 
exemption system is complicated compared to either full taxation or full exemption, 
because it exempts only a part of the profits of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. 
corporations from taxation.39 
 
II. CHANGING ISSUES WITH THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIMES  
 
When observing international tax regimes through a humanitarian lens, it is 
necessary to identify the prevalent issues in the current tax landscape. These major 
issues are partly responsible for the inequities between developing and developed 
nations. Part A will discuss the recent methods of tax evasion, the legislative and 
diplomatic response to this issue, and the remaining flaws to be solved. Part B will 
discuss the issue of double international taxation and the United States’ current 
attempts to mitigate the issue. 
 
A.  Tax Evasion  
 
Economists such as Gabriel Zucman from UC Berkeley have estimated that 
over 20 trillion tax dollars a year are evaded.40 Therefore, it is no surprise that the 
most important aspect of this discussion is developments within the past decade 
that have highlighted the potential of significantly improving the revenue raising 
 
37 See 26 U.S.C.S. § 61 (2020). 
38 See Kyle Pomerleau, A Hybrid Approach: The Treatment of Foreign Profits under the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act, TAX FOUND., Fiscal Fact No. 586 (May 3, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/treatment-
foreign-profits-tax-cuts-jobs-act/. 
39 Id. 
40 He computed this using statistics from the Bank of International Settlements in Basel that show 
disparities between what countries’ official books show and what their actual investments are. His 
assumption is that illegal investment tax evasion is done exclusively by the elite, which is a plausible 
assumption. There was more information released that supported this assumption through the 
Panama Papers hacking. Both the Panama Papers and Paradise Paper hackings, or leaks, have 
revealed the scope of the elitist involvement in tax evasions within many developing countries. 
Annette Alstadsæter, Niels Johannesen & Gabriel Zucman, Who Owns the Wealth in Tax Havens? 
Macro Evidence and Implications for Global Inequality, 162 L.J. OF PUB. ECON., 89-100 (2018). 
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capacity of these taxes. Because of developing countries’ relative lack of leverage 
over their wealthy residents, they do not have enough power to curb tax evasion. 
This lack of leverage is most visible in the context of multinational corporations, 
and it perpetuates the limited capacity developing nations possess to collect income 
tax from the wealthy.41 Instead, advancements have been developed within the 
wealthy countries, such as the creation of instruments and techniques, that promise 
to significantly reduce the scope of this type of tax evasion and to increase 
revenue.42  
First, tax evasion is a fundamental problem that has traditionally been difficult 
for both developing and developed countries to control. Although the IRS is the 
most sophisticated tax agency in the world, the ability to enforce individual income 
taxes in situations where there is neither withholding nor information reporting is 
quite limited (below 70% compliance).43    
Neither withholding nor information reporting applies easily when the income 
is from foreign sources. Regarding withholding, since 1984, the United States 
implemented the portfolio interest exemption which unilaterally abolished 
withholding on interest payments to foreigners.44 This was done to attract more 
investment and attract it in a way that would not require information reporting.45 
Within the international context, there is no treaty that is required to avoid 
withholding. Although treaties generally require the collection of information, 
 
41 See Hugh Ault & Brian Arnold, Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries: An Overview, 
2 UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. AND SOC. AFF., (May 2013) (“While the work of the OECD is 
important, and made substantial efforts to take the viewpoints of developing countries into account 
in formulating its analysis, it was clear from the beginning that some kind of independent 
examination of the problems of tax avoidance and the resulting profit shifting and base erosion from 
the perspective of developing countries was required. This is true for a number of reasons. In the 
first place, most developing countries are primarily (though not exclusively) concerned with the 
reduction in source-based taxation, rather than the shifting of the domestic income of locally-owned 
companies to low or no tax jurisdictions. Secondly, the corporate tax on inward investment typically 
plays a larger role in total revenue in developing countries than in countries with more developed 
tax systems. In addition, the potential responses to base erosion and profit shifting are limited to 
some extent by the administrative capacity of developing country tax administrations.”). 
42 See generally Technology Tools to Tackle Tax Evasion and Tax Fraud, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION AND DEV., (2017), https://www.oecd.org/tax/crime/technology-tools-to-tackle-tax-
evasion-and-tax-fraud.pdf. 
43 Understanding the Tax Gap and Taxpayer Noncompliance, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 116th Cong. 2019 Leg., 1st Sess. 2 (testimony of Hon. J. Russell George, Treasury 
Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin.). 
44 See generally Marilyn Doskey Franson, Repeal of the Thirty Percent Withholding Tax on Portfolio 
Interest Paid to Foreign Investors, 6 NW. J. INT'L L.& BUS., 930 (1984-1985). 
45 Id. 
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American banks do not have the obligation to collect any information about foreign 
interest payments. 
Thus, members of the elite in some developing countries specifically invest 
within the United States to avoid detection.46 The only requirement for a foreign 
investor to invest and avoid detection is to establish a shell corporation.47 Once a 
shell corporation is established, the foreign investor can invest his or her money 
into the United States through the corporation. Another benefit of a shell 
corporation is that it allows foreign investors to create corporate bonds, which are 
exempt from withholding on interest. Further, no information about the beneficial 
owner (i.e., the actual investor) of the shell corporation can be given.48 Therefore, 
account holders accumulate money offshore undetected. 
This system has led to significant problems since its inception. Within a year of 
the adoption of the portfolio interest exemption, over 300 billion dollars was moved 
from Latin American countries to banks in Miami, Florida.49 This movement of 
money was essentially the same as the entire amount of official aid (i.e., 
governmental assistance) that was given to all these countries combined. The 
political elites immediately pocketed the official aid once it was given and put it 
back into the banks, creating a cyclical process.50 
Further, large sums of money were moved through shell corporations in the 
Cayman Islands and other tax havens where the taxes are unenforceable.51 Ten 
years ago, however, meaningful change occurred due to problems within wealthy 
 
46 Gaspard Sebag, UBS Ordered to Pay Record $5.1 Billion in French Tax Fraud Trial, BLOOMBERG 
(Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-20/ubs-ordered-to-pay-more-
than-4-2-billion-in-french-tax-trial. 
47 A shell Corporation in a tax haven can be done easily while abroad, without ever having to visit 
the investing country. See Michael Winter, Google Dodged $ 2 Billion in Taxes Using a Shell 
Company in Bermuda, USA TODAY (Dec. 11, 2012), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2012/12/10/google-bermuda-shell-company-2-billion-tax-
dodge/1759833/; See also Michele Fletcher, The Transfer Pricing Labyrinth, GLOBAL FIN. 
INTEGRITY (June 26, 2014), https://gfintegrity.org/transfer-pricing-labyrinth/. 
48  Interest payments made to foreign corporations are exempted under the “portfolio interest 
exemption” without any U.S. tax withholding. 26 U.S.C.S. § 871(h) (2020). 
49 See Charles E. McLure, Jr., U.S. Tax Laws and Capital Flight from Latin America, 20 INTER-
AMERICAN L. REV., 321 (1989); Chander Kant, Foreign Direct Investment and Capital Flight 1 
(Princeton Studies in Int’l Fin. No. 80, 1996). 
50 Jorgen Juel Andersen, Niels Johannesen & Bob Rijkers, Elite Capture of Foreign Aid: Evidence 
from Offshore Bank Accounts 1-5 (World Bank Grp., Working Paper No. 9150, 2020). 
51 Chris Horton, The UBS/IRS Settlement Agreement and Cayman Island Hedge Funds, 41 UNIV. OF 
MIAMI INTER-AMER. L. REV. 357, 362 (2010). 
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countries like the U.S. and members of the European Union.52 These countries did 
not retain withholding policies that allowed for investor information to be collected, 
and it became difficult to determine whether foreign investors were actually 
foreigners. Governments rightfully were concerned that citizens were engaging in 
round-trip transactions.53 The U.S. Senate held hearings involving Union Bank of 
Switzerland (“UBS”) to investigate the matter. 54  The Senate determined that 
Americans were taking advantage of the same provisions and pretending to be 
foreigners for the purpose of avoiding taxes.55 UBS’s system would send bankers 
to places where the wealthy congregate within the U.S., and these bankers would 
persuade wealthy Americans to give them their money through electronic transfers. 
The money usually was transferred from accounts that were already offshore, but 
sometimes, the money would be smuggled offshore through methods such as hiding 
diamonds inside of toothpaste.56 Once all the money was offshore, UBS would 
create American shell corporations in the Cayman Islands.57 Next, these ‘foreign’ 
shell corporations would invest via UBS and Zurich back into the United States.58 
Eventually, a whistleblower discovered this system and reported it in exchange 
for a reward of 100 million dollars.59 At the UBS Senate hearing, UBS maintained 
that their actions were entirely legal because their conduct adhered to the written 
law.60 According to UBS’s interpretation of the law, the owner of the money only 
was required to give UBS a W-8 BEN form attesting to be a foreigner once they 
created the foreign shell corporation.61 UBS felt that it was perfectly legal for it to 
collect the funds and transmit them to the Cayman entity, even though some agents 
 
52 Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance - Obtaining the Names of U.S. Clients with Swiss 
Accounts: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm., on Investigations, 111th Cong. 1 (2009). 
53 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, What Goes Around Comes Around: Why the US is Responsible for Capital 
Flight (and What it Can Do about It), (Jan. 23, 2013). U of Michigan Public Law Research Paper 
No. 307, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2208553.  
54 Id. 
55 Tax Haven Banks and U. S. Tax Compliance - Obtaining the Names of U.S. Clients with Swiss 
Accounts: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm., on Investigations, 111th Cong. 1 (2009). 
56 Id. 
57 See Offshore Tax-Avoidance and IRS Compliance Efforts, Internal Revenue Serv. (July 8, 2020), 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/offshore-tax-avoidance-and-irs-compliance-efforts. 
58 Sebag, supra note 46. 
59 Eamon Javers, Why Did the US Pay This Former Swiss Banker $104M?, CNBC (Apr. 30, 2015), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/30/why-did-the-us-pay-this-former-swiss-banker-104m.html. 
60 Tax Haven Banks and U. S. Tax Compliance - Obtaining the Names of U.S. Clients with Swiss 
Accounts: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm, on Investigations, 111th Cong. 1 (2009). 
61 Id. 
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of UBS actually knew that the owner of this corporation was an American.62 
To address this crisis, Congress enacted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act (“FATCA”) of 2010 to supervise and regulate accounts that are suspected to be 
American owned.63 FATCA applies to foreign financial institutions and requires 
that if an institution knows or has reason to know that it has an American-owned 
account, it must report that information to the IRS.64 If the institution fails to do so, 
it can be subject to penalties such as withholding tax on the institution’s own 
income from U.S. sources, which, for many, is a hefty penalty.65 If FATCA had 
been approved before the UBS scheme, UBS, which receives a large income from 
U.S. branches all over the country, would have been in financial disaster for being 
non-compliant.  
Unfortunately, FATCA has not been as effective as planned. The way FATCA 
is written has been mostly unenforceable because foreign financial institutions face 
domestic criminal offences for disclosing information about their depositors to the 
IRS. 66  However, under the Obama administration, the Treasury Department 
successfully negotiated intergovernmental agreements with more than 100 
countries to permit these foreign institutions to provide information to their own 
government. Then, the foreign government under the Intergovernmental 
Agreement shares the information with the IRS. 67  These negotiations have 
promoted numerous international multilateral agreements for the automatic 
exchange of tax information under the so-called “common reporting standards.”68 
While this change was positive for American policies, many international countries 
were displeased with FATCA because they felt it was an overstep of Americans 
telling their banks what to do and what information to give.69 The added penalties 
 
62 Id. 
63 FATCA was the brainchild of Charlie Rangel, the head of the Ways and Means Committee at the 
time. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–1474, § 6038D. 




65 H.R. 3933, 111th Cong. (2009). 
66 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 53.  
67 W.H. Office of the Pr. Sec., Fact Sheet: Obama Administration Announces Steps to Strengthen 
Financial Transparency, and Combat Money Laundering, Corruption, and Tax Evasion, Obama 
White House Archives (May 5, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/05/05/fact-sheet-obama-administration-announces-steps-strengthen-financial. 
68 This is a standardized computerized way of exchanging information between countries. 
69 Armando Mombelli, The day UBS, the biggest Swiss bank, was saved, SWI (Oct. 16, 2018, 8:00 
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also bothered many foreign nations.70 However, FATCA proved to be effective and 
led directly to the development of this multilateral forum for the exchange of tax 
information.  
Even though the U.S. did not join the multilateral efforts for the automatic 
exchange of tax information, their impact has remained significant. Because of the 
underlying fear that some banks will report the illegality of the accounts, it has 
made it more difficult for people to engage in the same level of tax evasion as they 
once did.  However, because not all countries participate with these new rules, 
money still flows where there is non-compliance.71 
Nonetheless, there are other interesting developments for corporate tax income, 
which is why it is important to look back on the great financial crisis of 2008-2009 
within the U.S. To cope with the crisis, banks were bailed out by the government, 
leading to a deep recession. However, the situation was very different in Europe, 
where, unlike most governments, countries do not get to print their own money. 
Instead, the Euro is controlled by the European Central Bank, which is known to 
be relatively penurious. Combined with the 2008-09 great recession, this resulted 
in widespread austerity and cutbacks on government services. At the same time, 
there were also parliamentary hearings in the UK which revealed that many 
multinationals were illegally avoiding paying significant amounts of tax.72 These 





70 Avi-Yonah, supra note 53.  
71 At the moment it seems Singapore is the main international culprit. And they have gained some 
income flow, but nevertheless they have imposed significant transaction costs. 
72 Eric Pfanner, British Lawmakers Accuse Multinationals of ‘Immorally’ Avoiding Taxes, N.Y 
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/business/global/british-lawmakers-
accuse-mulitnationals-of-immorally-avoiding-taxes.html. 
73 For example, Starbucks in the UK sent most of its income to Luxembourg where the Starbucks 
main brand was registered by way of royalties for using the Starbucks name. This perfectly legal 
payment was deductible under the EU rules and could also not be subject to any kind of withholding 
tax. Luxembourg did not tax the income, but the result was that Starbucks was also not paying tax 
to the United States in the UK. Starbucks was so embarrassed by these hearings that they actually 
began making voluntary payments to the UK Treasury when this was discovered. Since World War 
Two, the Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) has been in charge of tax 
matters primarily within Europe. They created the base erosion and profit shifting project that they 
ran initially from 2013 to 2015, which involved significant series of actions that were designed to 
mitigate corporate tax avoidance.  
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B.  Double International Taxation 
 
The problem of double international taxation has also been difficult to address. 
Double international taxation refers to the situation where two jurisdictions are 
trying to tax the same income that was generated abroad. One proposed solution 
would be to implement credits for foreign taxes paid, where each credit would be 
the difference in paid foreign taxes with respect to that income and would make 
overall tax liability determinable. Usually there is up to a 10% return on tangible 
assets. Before 2018, this return could have been deferred and there was no 
participation exemption for individual taxation on a worldwide basis. 
The United States has already started to exempt interest incomes that belong to 
the category of non-business income of non-residents. Other countries followed suit 
and now interest income that is non-business income is exempt, either by domestic 
laws or treaties, worldwide.  
This exemption, however, has added to the problem of round-trip investments 
because wealthy investors from other countries can get tax free interest income 
from the U.S., so there is an incentive to set up offshore accounts. The income 
would not only be hidden, but they can also escape taxation in their home countries. 
The Base Erosion Anti-Abuse Tax (“BEAT”), as enacted in 2017, interacts with 
the business income aspect of non-residents, as well as residents by making it more 
difficult for taxpayers to decrease tax payments.74 Reinstating taxation of interest 
income at its source will solve two problems: first, the global tax evasion by 
wealthy foreigners, and second, the ability of United States taxpayers to obtain an 
exemption by pretending not to be United States taxpayers.  
For business income of non-residents to be taxed, the income must have had 
some nexus to the taxing jurisdiction. In the U.S. the nexus is the activity that rises 
to the level of conducting a legal business in the U.S. and the income has to be 
effectively connected to that legal business.75 The treaty concept, though, similar, 
is not identical. If a non-resident has a permanent establishment in the U.S., the 
income should be attributable to that permanent establishment. It is imperative to 
strengthen the ability of host countries to view certain connected activities and 
strengthen that non-personal nexus to the taxing jurisdiction. With the advancement 
of the digital economy, it is easier to conduct business without having a physical 
presence in the country. Therefore, some reforms are needed to protect taxation of 
 
74 See Tax Justice Network, infra, note 87 and accompanying text. 
75 I.R.C. § 864 (2021)  
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cross-border income.  
 
III. SOLUTIONS TO TAX PROBLEMS 
 
In December 2017, the United States passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“the 
Act”),76 the most significant tax code reform in over three decades.77 The support 
for this legislation stems in part from the idea that corporate income should be taxed 
somewhere, therefore preventing double non-taxation. 78  The Act includes two 
interesting, fundamental concepts that are going to significantly change the 
international tax landscape in a way that benefits developing countries: the Global 
Intangible Low-Tax Income (“GILTI”) and Base Erosion Anti-Abuse Tax 
(“BEAT”).79 
GILTI is a concept that involves a new category of foreign income intended to 
dissuade corporations from shifting profits out of the United States.80 Primarily 
applied to the United States multinational corporations, GILTI mandates that if the 
foreign tax rate on a corporation’s foreign subsidies is not high enough, the 
corporation will be taxed by the United States at a rate, that is at least half of the 
normal  rate. 81  The driving equitable principle is that the host countries of 
multinational corporations should impose tax when the foreign tax rate is too low. 
BEAT was designed to prevent tax revenue loss by limiting payments from 
U.S.-based companies to their foreign affiliates.82 BEAT works as an alternative 
tax mechanism that prohibits certain deductions, such as interest and royalties, paid 
to foreign related parties in order to reduce the U.S. tax base. This scheme, 
therefore, makes it more difficult for companies to avoid taxation in the United 
States through their foreign affiliates. 
GILTI and BEAT, the main innovations of the Act, are U.S. rules that were 
 
76  The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act is major tax legislation that affects individuals, businesses, tax 
exemptions and government entities. The IRS states that they are “working on implementing” the 
Act. See IRS, Tax Reform, https://www.irs.gov/tax-reform.  
77  Tax Foundation, Everything You Need to Know About the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 
https://taxfoundation.org/tax-reform-explained-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act/.  
78 Double non-taxation means not being taxed anywhere.  
79 The basic idea behind both concepts is that there should be one tax level imposed on global flows 
of corporate income. Budget Fiscal Year, 2018, PL 115-97, December 22, 2017, 131 Stat 2054. 
80 Tax Foundation, What’s up with Being GILTI?, https://taxfoundation.org/gilti-2019/.  
81 Id. (“GILTI is subject to a worldwide minimum tax of between 10.5 and 13.125 percent on an 
annual basis.”) 
82  Mindy Herzfeld, Can GILTI + BEAT = GLOBE?, 47 INTERTAX 504 (2019), 
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1892&context=facultypub.  
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adopted unilaterally and facially have little to do with developing countries. 
However, since 2017, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (“OECD”) has been engaged in BEPS 2.0.83 BEPS 2.0 is designed to 
supplement some of the oversights (like the failure to reach consensus on the digital 
economy) which were present in the first version of BEPS. Fundamentally, the idea 
again is to disallow deductions when there is no corresponding tax on the recipient 
side.84 
These developments, particularly FATCA and GILTI, are very promising, as 
they have the potential of benefiting the revenue raising capacity of developing 
countries despite being passed in an effort to benefit the United States. This 
increased capacity can, in turn, help these countries decrease the global wealth gap. 
 
IV. CRITICISMS OF RECENT SOLUTIONS 
 
There are, however, legitimate criticisms of these developments. First, an 
argument can be made on the basis of national sovereignty. Critics argue that 
developing countries should have the autonomy to decide whether it is in their best 
interest to provide multinational corporations with tax breaks. The argument asserts 
that developing countries should be free to engage in their own cost-benefit 
analysis, allowing them to determine if potential benefits, such as job growth, 
outweigh the costs. 
To an extent, this is an empirical issue. However, it is likely that developing 
countries feel extreme pressure to take deals with these multinational corporations, 
because failure to do so will result in heavy political criticism for not bringing jobs 
to their countries when the opportunity presents itself. 85  Therefore, these 
developing nations are not truly exercising their sovereign will if they give tax 
 
83 BEPS 2.0 is the second version of BEPS. 
84 Take a company like Intel, for example. Companies like Intel have traditionally gone to countries 
like Costa Rica and proposed plans to build a factory on the condition that the country provides 
them with a tax break, or they will build the factory in another country. Under the GILTI rule, Costa 
Rica can counter that even if they provide a tax deduction, Intel will still be paying the tax in the 
United States, so there is no real benefit to Intel in receiving the tax deduction. Instead, Intel will be 
incentivized to build the factory on the basis of other non-tax related considerations. See Herzfeld, 
supra note 83. 
85 In cases like the Intel and Costa Rica deal, scientists said the money given to Intel would have 
been more beneficial if spent in another manner, such as on small, local start-ups. However, the 
political advantage of a large job boom was seen to outweigh this empirical information, likely due 
to these aforementioned public pressures to bring corporations such as Intel into the country. 
2021:01]Tax, Policy, Global Economics, Labor, and Justice in Light of COVID 19 
breaks to multinational corporations solely to prevent them from going to another 
country. The multinational corporations clearly have the bargaining power in these 
situations and are forcing developing countries to offer them the best deal. Taking 
that power away from the multinationals, through GILTI and other tax reforms, 
evens the playing field for developing countries and prevents the race to the bottom. 
Second, some critics argue that it may not be wise to provide governments in 
many developing nations with resources, as they will waste them either because 
they are corrupt or non-democratic. This argument holds weight to an extent but is 
not applicable across the board. Many of the world’s developing nations have 
become democracies within the last 20 years, so for those nations, such an argument 
is unconvincing. Additionally, even when developing countries remain 
undemocratic, the alternative to providing them with any resources is to withhold 
all resources. This cannot remain a legitimate alternative. However, it is important 
to limit the ability of elites in those nations to engage in capital flight and filtering 
the money to their own accounts, which, to an extent, is exactly what FATCA has 
been able to achieve. By and large, these developments have operated as a fulcrum 
for the ability of developing countries to raise resources. 
However, these developments are also not without their faults. Notably, an 
information exchange of this kind may not be the most successful response to issues 
like tax evasion. Since the exchange is not a global network, it may not be enough 
for one country not to comply. The money will ultimately go to one of the few 
wealthier economies, such as the United States, the European Union, or Japan. 
These countries should ideally coordinate a withholding tax enabling them to 
ensure that the money is collected. This will help prevent situations where it is 
unclear whether tax was paid in the country where the investor is a resident. 
Even the global minimum tax, which is the global application of GILTI, has 
issues. For example, there is an exemption from GILTI which, in practice, 
encourages migration of jobs out of the United States and into developing countries 
because it means loopholes for tax holidays and exemptions.86 Many argue that the 
Biden administration 87  will need to address these shortcomings of current tax 
schemes and help mitigate those harms. Others argue that the Treasury Department 
should work on strategies.88 
 
86 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Biden’s International Tax Plan, 100 TAX NOTES INT’L 525 (Oct. 26, 
2020) (with G. Mazzoni). 
87 Id. 
88 Tax Foundation, supra note 81. 
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Another focal point should be cross crediting, which averages high tax countries 
with low tax countries and encourages a tax obligation. The OECD draft report 
addresses some of these issues.89 While the responses are not perfect and there is 
still work to be done, the situation has significantly improved in the last ten years.90 
Significant reform has taken place since 2010, when the situation was at its worst, 




Ultimately, until wealthier nations further assist the developing world by 
ridding themselves of the unequitable consequences of tax evasion and resource 
hoarding, emerging global issues will continue to highlight and exacerbate the 
wealth gaps between these states. Nevertheless, despite the evasion of 
approximately 20 trillion dollars annually in global taxation, the recent 
development and implementation of programs like FATCA and GILTI, along with 
the OECD’s engagement with formulating BEPS 2.0, has significant value as both 
a starting point and blueprint for developing countries to begin increasing their 
revenue raising capacities. Still, state governments, regardless of their country’s 
economic status and corporate favorability, must ensure that these programs do not 
result in excessive round-trip investments, the flow of money into areas of 
noncompliance with the programs, or misappropriated windfalls to non-democratic 
states. Looking ahead, particularly during a pandemic in which most countries are 
falling into budgetary deficits, increasing inequity from these issues only further 
emphasizes the need to establish tax programs with the authority to mandate 
compliance, punish the exploitation of tax loopholes, and fundamentally ensure that 
the wealthiest beneficiaries of global trade (i.e., multinational corporations), are 
paying their fair share. 
 
 
* * * 
 
 
89 OECD (2020), Transfer Pricing Guidance on Financial Transactions: Inclusive Framework on 
BEPS Actions 4, 8-10, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/tax/beps/transfer-pricing-guidance-on-
financial-transactions-inclusive-framework-on-beps-actions-4-8- 10.htm. 
90 2010, ten years ago, was the tail end of the financial crisis. 
